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DELAY IN PROCESS, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: THE
JURISPRUDENCE AND EMPIRICS OF SPEEDY
TRIALS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE*
JAYANTH K. KRISHNAN** AND C. RAJ KUMAR***
ABSTRACT
Criminal law scholars regularly maintain that American prisons are over-
crowded and that defendants in custody wait long periods of time before having
their cases brought to trial. A similar refrain is made of the penal process in
India—the world’s largest democracy, an ally of the United States, and a country
with a judiciary that draws upon American criminal procedure law. In fact, the
situation in India is thought to be much worse. Accounts of prisoners languish-
ing behind bars for several years—and sometimes decades—awaiting their day
in court are not uncommon. Many Indian prisons are between 100% and
200% over capacity, where conditions are squalid and the weaker inmates face
serious physical harm.
In this study, we examine the current state of the Indian criminal justice
system. Beginning in 1979, the Indian Supreme Court, referencing the Ameri-
can Constitution’s Sixth Amendment, held that defendants had a fundamental
right to a speedy trial. We examine the evolution of the Indian jurisprudence on
* The title of this piece intentionally draws upon the famous phrase, “justice delayed is justice
denied,” in that our specific focus is on procedural rules and norms and how the absence of these
can lead to a systematic denial in justice. (Note there is conflict as to who actually coined this
saying. It is often attributed to William E. Gladstone, while there is contention that it traces its
roots to the 1215 Magna Carta. Compare LAURENCE J PETER, PETER’S QUOTATIONS 276 (1977), with
Bob Woffinden, CCRC’s Extreme Delays, INNOCENT, July 2009, http://www.innocent.org.uk/cases/
Karl%20Watson%20-%20Woffinden%20art.pdf (last visited Mar. 29. 2011).
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this matter, which has been quite favorable for defendants. Then we move beyond
this line of inquiry by empirically evaluating whether the positive court rulings
have translated into tangible changes for the criminally accused. As our findings
suggest, there exists a major gap in India between these encouraging judicial
pronouncements and how the right plays out in reality, which we believe provides
an important perspective for comparative and criminal law scholars.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, perhaps no modern legal scholar has made as
significant an impact on the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial clause
than Professor Akhil Amar of Yale Law School.1 In his work, Amar uses
detailed, historical legal analysis to make a provocative argument
concerning the rights of defendants who failed to receive a speedy trial.
Amar contends that in such cases the remedy of “dismissal with
prejudice”2—the standard set-forth by the Supreme Court as early as
19723—can perversely serve as a “windfall”4 for defendants and place
society in danger, especially when there is overwhelming evidence that
the pre-trial detainee is guilty.5 Instead, for Amar, the proper remedy in
these instances involves releasing the defendant, allowing the prosecu-
1. See e.g., AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997);
Akhil Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. LJ. 641 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Sixth
Amendment]. For a classic work, to which Amar refers, see generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy
Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV. 525 (1975).
2. See Amar, Sixth Amendment, supra note 1, at 645.
3. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992)
(reaffirming the balancing test set-forth in Barker).
4. See Amar, Sixth Amendment, supra note 1, at 646.
5. Id.
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tion to re-file charges at a later date, but also providing the defendant
with some form of compensatory or punitive damages.6
Amar’s framework has received a great deal of attention, but also
harsh criticism from those who accuse him of rolling back the advances
made on behalf of defendants who often lack sufficient resources or
sophistication to have proper representation.7 In addition, there is the
charge that his work is too ethereal and constitutionally focused (and
thus ivory tower in nature);8 when, in fact, in practice there is little
speedy trial litigation in the first place. After all, across the country
there are state statutes that address this subject, with which prosecutors
usually comply.9 If litigation does occur, it is often based on technical
grounds rather than on classic Sixth Amendment principles.10
Nevertheless, the Amarian notion of not dismissing charges, carte
blanche, against a defendant whose speedy trial right has been violated
raises interesting issues especially when comparing it to other legal
systems. Indeed, his framework is informative and useful for consider-
ing how India, a democracy with a common law legal system that draws
on the United States, has been struggling with a serious backlog in
criminal cases that have failed to reach the courts.
In India there are thousands of defendants who have been languish-
6. Id. at 652–58.
7. For one of the harshest critiques of Amar’s criminal procedure work generally, including,
in part, his Sixth Amendment analysis, see Susan R. Klein, Enduring Principles and Current Crises in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 533 (1999) (reviewing AKHIL AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)).
8. See id. at 534, 536 (noting, derisively, that Amar’s analysis “is myopic and his analysis fails to
mesh with the empirical world of criminal law practice.” And that “Amar often ignores critical
issues in constitutional criminal procedure . . . [and may do so partly] because he lacks real-world
experience in the criminal justice system, and in part because the issues with which he chooses to
grapple are better suited for academic discourse: they do not involve factual questions requiring
empirically based answers, they are relatively self-contained, and they are more amenable to a
unified theory.”).
9. See e.g., SUSAN N. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 223 (2006) (noting that “[t]here are not many examples of state
courts relying on their own state Constitutions to create more expansive speedy trial rights for
criminal defendants, although state statutes and rules do set clearer and more demanding time
limits than the federal constitutional floor would usually require.”); see also Brian P. Brooks,
Comment, A New Speedy Trial Standard for Barker v. Wingo: Reviving a Constitutional Remedy in an
Age of Statutes, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 587 (1994); Email Correspondence with Professor, Expert
Practitioner, and Criminal Defense Lawyer, Ted Sampsell-Jones (May 3, 2010) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Sampsell-Jones Correspondence].
10. This might include, for example, whether a judge’s schedule, which may be overbooked,
tolls the prescribed period specified within a jurisdiction’s given statute. See Sampsell-Jones
Correspondence, supra note 9.
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ing in jails,11 awaiting trial—many for longer than a formal sentence
would have brought. The term of art used to describe all non-convicted
defendants within the Indian criminal justice process is “undertrial” in
that these individuals are deemed to be under the umbrella of the trial
process.12 Undertrial-prisoners are thought to comprise a staggering
seventy percent of India’s incarcerated population.13 Moreover, this
issue is one that many within the country have recognized as reaching a
breaking point; consider that diverse observers such as high-ranking
government officials, civil society activists, lawyers, and judges have in
unison called for massive reforms in the country’s penal process.14
This crisis is occurring against a paradoxical Indian landscape.15 On
the one hand, India is a dominant power on the world stage today. With
a potent nuclear arsenal, high economic growth, a vibrant and young
labor force, and ever-increasing levels of foreign investment,16 India is
11. In India the term “jail” is used more frequently than, but interchangeably with, the term
“prison.” Parts III and IV of this article discuss the statistics involving those who are in Indian jails,
but one of the alarming facts is how Indian jails often do not segregate their inmates, thus
resulting in a situation where people awaiting trial are sharing cells with hardened convicts. See
discussion infra Parts III, IV. In contrast, in the United States, there is a distinct difference between
jails and prisons, with the former often having less formalized protocol and greater variation in
enforcement standards than the latter. The result is that jails can at times place inmates in greater
danger than prisons. (This is even given that jails typically hold people for misdemeanors or as
they await final outcomes of trials, while prisons generally incarcerate people convicted of
felonies.) For a recent series on the American jail and prison system, see Crime and Punishment in
America: Rough Justice, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/
16640389; see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON RAPE IN JAILS IN THE U.S (Dec. 29, 2008),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/reviewpanel/pdfs/prea_finalreport_081229.pdf [hereinafter DOJ
Dec. 2008 Report]; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON RAPE IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS IN THE U.S.,
(Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/reviewpanel/pdfs/prea_finalreport_080924.pdf [here-
inafter DOJ Sept. 2008 Report]. We thank Professor Wayne Logan (Florida State University) for
highlighting this important point to us.
12. This term will be used, referenced, and cited extensively in Parts II–IV.
13. The Indian Minister for Law and Justice, M. Veerappa Moily, himself has noted this
statistic. See 92,000 Undertrial Prisoners Released Across India, IGOVERNMENT, May 27, 2010, http://
igovernment.in/site/92000-undertrial-prisoners-released-across-india-37660. We will be discuss-
ing the Law Minister’s efforts in Parts III and IV.
14. We highlight in detail the work and studies of these various observers in Parts II–IV. But
see KIRAN BEDI, IT’S ALWAYS POSSIBLE: ONE WOMAN’S TRANSFORMATION OF TIHAR PRISON (2006)
(arguing that the situation in one of India’s most notorious penitentiaries has improved).
15. For a discussion of this particular term and occurrence of this “paradox,” see The Paradox
of India’s New Prosperity, REDIFF BUSINESS, Jan. 14, 2010, http://business.rediff.com/column/2010/
jan/14/guest-the-paradox-of-indias-new-prosperity.htm.
16. Country Fast Facts: India, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/04/
country_facts/main3328865.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2011); India’s Economy: Turning Sour,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2008, http://www.economist.com/node/11848576?story_idE1_TTRQRVSG;
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a country that most acute international observers see as being a lead
actor in the twenty-first century.17 Further, the beauty of the Indian
experiment is that despite the odds, it succeeds as a pluralist parliamen-
tary democracy.
At the same, however, India suffers from a host of major problems.
Corruption, intense poverty, illiteracy for large swaths of the popula-
tion, a lack of adequate educational institutions, and poor infrastruc-
ture are just some of the daunting challenges that confront the Indian
state.18 Furthermore, empirical research conducted on the civil justice
side of the Indian legal system highlights a routine failure, on the part
of the courts, to provide remedies to aggrieved parties in a timely
manner.19 With these hardships present, it is difficult to envision how
the state can also cope with such an underperforming criminal justice
system. Yet that is the place India currently finds itself; namely, in a
situation where because of how glacially slow the adjudication process
is for criminal matters, this system and many of its administrators are
seen as all but ineffectual. For a country that aspires to be a leading
democratic power during the millennium, it thus seems untenable that
this goal can be achieved when speedy trials for defendants, and an
Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050 (Oct. 2003), http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/
brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf; BRICs and Beyond (Nov. 2007), http://www2.goldmansachs.com/
ideas/brics/BRICs-and-Beyond.html; Neil Rose, Passage to India?, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE, Apr. 17,
2008, http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/features/passage-india-0.
17. See supra text accompanying note 16.
18. In terms of data on corruption in India, Transparency International (TI) has been at the
forefront of tracking and critiquing this problem. For information from TI-India (TII), see
Transparency International India, http://www.transparencyindia.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2011);
see also Jayanth K. Krishnan, Scholarly Discourse, Public Perceptions, and the Cementing of Norms: The Case
of the Indian Supreme Court and a Plea for Research, 29 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 255 (2007) [hereinafter
Krishnan, Scholarly Discourse]; C. Raj Kumar, Corruption as a Human Rights: Promoting Transparency in
Good Governance and the Fundamental Right to Corruption-Free Services in India, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
31 (2003). For a sample of other works that have focused on these various subjects, see generally
PAUL BRASS, THE POLITICS OF INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1994); ATUL DOHLI, DEMOCRACY AND
DISCONTENT: INDIA’S GROWING CRISIS OF GOVERNABILITY (1990); ATUL KOHLI, THE STATE AND
POVERTY IN INDIA: THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1987); PRATAP BHANU MEHTA, THE BURDEN OF
DEMOCRACY (2003); LLOYD RUDOLPH & SUSANNE RUDOLPH, IN PURSUIT OF LAKSHMI: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE INDIAN STATE (1987); Pratap Bhanu Mehta, A Decade of Hope, OUTLOOK INDIA,
Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?263732.
19. See e.g., Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and Legal
Rights in India, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 96
(2003) [hereinafter Galanter & Krishnan, Debased Informalism]; ROBERT MOOG, WHOSE INTERESTS
ARE SUPREME? THE ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS OF THE CIVIL COURTS IN TWO DISTRICTS OF UTTAR
PRADESH (1997); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Social Policy Advocacy and the Role of the Courts in India, 21 AM.
ASIAN REV. 91 (2003).
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efficient criminal justice system overall—all vital lynchpins in a consoli-
dated democracy—are so unrealized in everyday practice.
In this article, we assess systematically the undertrial predicament in
India. Because so little rigorous jurisprudential and empirical work has
been done on the subject, we approach our task through a set of
deliberate steps. In Section I, we contextualize our India-project within
the broader academic literature on speedy trials. To be sure, American
scholarship on this topic is relevant, particularly because Indian courts
have often looked to U.S. law in adjudicating these matters; but
scholars from other jurisdictions have also contributed.
In Section II, we focus on the Indian constitutional approach to
speedy trials. During the framing of the Indian constitution in the late
1940s, assembly-members, when drafting Article 21, discussed due
process, the right to life, and other issues;20 but the notion of a speedy
trial was not explicitly included within the constitutional text. It was
only in 1979 that the Supreme Court of India held that a speedy trial
was a fundamental constitutional right (under Article 21) for criminal
defendants.21 As we will show in the first part of this section, the Indian
courts have proceeded to reiterate this principle in subsequent cases.
Unfortunately the empirical reality for defendants in India awaiting
trial has failed to conform with these repeated judicial pronounce-
ments. Drawing on a series of statistical data, we highlight, in the
second part of Section II, how since that late 1970s Supreme Court case
the number of undertrial-prisoners has significantly increased to the
point where the vast majority of incarcerated are not those who have
been convicted but instead are simply those waiting for their day in
court.
In Section III, we evaluate the various governmental reports that over
the years have attempted to address this undertrial quandary. Included
in our evaluation is the current government’s plan to release a large
percentage of the undertrial population.22 Our thesis is that while on
paper many of these past and present proposals have good intentions
and offer some relief, greater structural and fundamental reform is
needed throughout various points in the criminal justice process
before the undertrial problem is resolved.
In Section IV we offer our preliminary set of recommendations. We
20. See e.g., Transcript of the Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume VII, at 1–20 (Dec. 6,
1948), available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p20b.htm.
21. This occurred in the important case of Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Ministry, (1979)
3 S.C.R. 169.
22. See infra Parts III, IV.
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base these recommendations on fieldwork and interview data collected
during the summer of 2010 from a range of experts, many of whom
have experience working in the criminal justice system, but currently
serve as vigorous non-governmental activists. We provide a set of
proposals we believe could help alter the undertrial pathology inhering
within the Indian penal process. Ultimately, our belief is that to further
strengthen India’s democratic state there must be an end to the
undertrial debacle. Ensuring that the criminally accused are provided
with the right to a speedy trial would go a long way in having this
important objective realized.
I. THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON SPEEDY TRIALS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
As several writers note, references to a speedy trial date back to the
twelfth century and the Assize of Clarendon, followed by its presence in
the Magna Carta of 1215, as well as in the famous tomes of Sir Edward
Coke.23 And because this sacred “entitlement . . . had been present in
English law for over half a millennium,”24 it should not be surprising
that revolutionaries in colonial America valued this right.25
The speedy trial case law in the United States did not begin to
develop until the twentieth century, with the Supreme Court’s 1905
decision in Beavers v. Haubert.26 In what was a rather unhelpful ruling
for future cases, the Court in Beavers held that the speedy trial clause
would be violated “depend[ing] upon the circumstances”27 of the
particular facts at hand. For the next several decades the Court
incrementally enhanced the speedy trial rights of defendants in a series
of judgments.28 It was not until 1972, in Barker v. Wingo, that the Court
23. See, e.g., Darren Allen, The Constitutional Floor Doctrine and the Right to a Speedy Trial,
26 CAMPBELL L. REV. 101, 103 (2004); Patrick Ellard, Learning from Katrina: Emphasizing the Right to a
Speedy Trial to Protect Constitutional Guarantees in Disasters, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1207, 1209–10
(2007); Lewis LeNaire, Vermont v. Brillon: Public Defense and the Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy
Trial, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 219, 220–21 (2010); Brooks, supra note 9, at 587. For a discussion of
Coke’s views, see EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
54–56 (1809).
24. See LeNaire, supra note 23, at 221.
25. Id.
26. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905); see also LeNaire, supra note 23, at 221.
27. See Beavers, 198 U.S. at 87; see also Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and
Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 419 n. 442 (1990).
28. See, e.g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969);
Klopfer v. North Carolina 386 U.S. 213 (1967); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966);
Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957). All of these cases are nicely discussed and the
evolution is presented in LeNaire, supra note 23, at 221–23. For other literature discussing this
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enunciated a four-part balancing test meant to clarify when this provi-
sion of the Sixth Amendment would be violated.29
In Barker, a unanimous opinion, Justice Lewis Powell stated that
courts needed to weigh factors such as “[l]ength of delay, the reason
for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to
the defendant”30 when deciding if prosecutors were complying with the
speedy trial guarantee of the Constitution. Almost immediately after
the decision, though, the Supreme Court’s rationale came under great
scrutiny by prominent scholars. For example, Columbia University law
professor Richard Uviller famously charged that the Barker test was “less
than gratifying . . . [with] [t]he result . . . [being] a right debilitated, its
components askew.”31 In his assessment of Barker and its immediate
progeny, Strunk v. United States (1973), Professor Anthony Amsterdam,
pre-dating part of Akhil Amar’s critique, delivered a stinging rebuke of
both holdings.32 Amsterdam noted that the Court’s approach—
particularly in the latter case where it held that the outcome for
violating the former’s balancing test must be dismissal with prejudice—
was both “incredible”33 and “plainly unsound.”34
The contention from these critics was that by making the only
remedy for a speedy trial violation a complete dismissal, lower court
judges would be loath to find in favor of defendants when such claims
were brought, because of the inevitable, drastic outcome—uncondi-
tional release.35 Interestingly, shortly after both Barker and Strunk the
evolution, see Allen, supra note 23, at 104 n.19; Bruce A. Green, “Hare and Hounds:” The Fugitive
Defendant’s Constitutional Right to be Pursued: United States v. Diacolis, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 439, 444
n.22 (1990); Jeremy Root, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Reconsideration of the Lackey Claim,
27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 321 n.241 (2001–2002).
29. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–32 (1972).
30. Id. at 531. For further discussion, see LeNaire supra note 23, at 223–24.
31. H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1376
(1972).
32. See Amsterdam, supra note 1. But see Amar, Sixth Amendment, supra note 1, at 650 n.38
(noting his disagreement with Amsterdam’s analysis).
33. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 534.
34. Id. at 538.
35. See e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1509, 1515 (2009). Starr also discusses Amsterdam’s article as well as Amar’s piece, and notes
that “[s]cholars and courts have recognized that this extreme remedy dissuades trial and appellate
judges from finding violations . . . .” Id. She also goes on to quote Herman, noting that: “As Susan
Herman concludes on the basis of a comprehensive review of the case law, the ‘severity of the
remedy . . . has had a profound effect on the development of speedy trial jurisprudence.’
Ultimately, ‘dismissal is granted in a tiny fraction of the thousands of constitutional speedy trial
claims brought every year.’” Id. (quoting HERMAN, supra note 9, at 230).
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federal Speedy Trial Act (STA) of 1974 came into existence.36 The STA
codified a series of requirements under which a defendant’s case had
to move forward upon an arrest.37 Yet to the ire of some observers, the
federal law contained exceptions allowing judges to toll the STA’s rules
wherever the “ends of justice”38 so demanded. Partially allaying these
concerns, however, the Supreme Court in 2010 weighed in on this
matter.39 In a seven-to-two ruling, the Court held that the presumption
would be that prosecutors could not toll the statutorily prescribed
period of seventy days to bring a defendant to trial (from the date of
indictment), except on those seemingly rare occasions where the ends
of justice would so warrant.40
Another sentiment found within the literature relates to the fact that
there is variation among the states as to how violations of speedy trials
are defined. Consider the important work of Professor Douglas Colbert
who for years has charged that petty-crime defendants often are not
able to make bail and thus serve long periods of time in jails awaiting
their day in court.41 Because they lack the resources or do not have a
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3161–3174 (1974).
37. For example, a defendant’s trial is to occur within seventy days of being indicted or from
when there is a first appearance in court, whichever is the later. Id. at § 3161(c)(1). In addition,
“information or indictment must be filed within thirty days of the arrest or the service of a
summons on the defendant. The trial must begin within seventy days of the filing of the
information or indictment, or within seventy days of the date the defendant first appears before a
judicial officer, whichever is later.” 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 382, 389–91 (2009). See also
id. at 393 (discussing how “[t]o provide a defendant with an adequate opportunity to prepare, a
trial may not begin earlier than thirty days after the defendant first appears through counsel or
expressly waives counsel and elects to proceed pro se, unless the defendant consents in writing to
an earlier date for trial”). See also Richard S. Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
667 (1976).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(a) (1974). For a critique of this provision, see, e.g., J. Andrew
Read, Open-Ended Continuances: An End-Run around the Speedy Trial Act, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 733
(1997).
39. See Bloate v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345 (2010).
40. Id. at 1352. In other words, it appears that the presumption will be in favor of not tolling
the clock against the defendant, but this presumption is rebuttable “if the [trial] judge finds that
‘the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
defendant in a speedy trial’ and records those findings.” Id. at 1355 (quoting § 3161(h)(7)(a)). As
stated, the decision was 7–2, with Justice Thomas writing for the majority and Justice Alito writing a
dissent (joined by Justice Breyer).
41. We are grateful to Professor Wayne A. Logan of Florida State University for alerting us to
the contributions of Professor Colbert. See e.g., Douglas Colbert, Coming Soon to a Court Near
You—Convicting the Unrepresented at the Bail Stage: An Autopsy of a State High Court’s Sua Sponte
Rejection of Indigent Defendants’ Right to Counsel, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 653 (2006) [hereinafter
Colbert, Coming Soon]; Douglas Colbert, Ray Paternoster, & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really
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right to access counsel,42 these individuals effectively serve as the
American version of the undertrial-detainees.43 Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, then, what some have argued was a landmark ruling by the Court
in 1992, where a defendant who was unaware that he had been indicted
and was then arrested some eight years later was found to have had his
speedy trial rights violated, to others is cold comfort given the overall
lack of vigor that this provision of the Sixth Amendment has received.44
In the comparative context, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1976), which has over one hundred seventy state
signatories, includes a promise to afford defendants the right to a
speedy trial.45 In terms of specific countries and regions, the depth of
the protection varies. In Canada, for example, substantive commentar-
ies express frustration with that country’s Supreme Court, which has
held that a speedy trial is equivalent to a “trial within a reasonable
time.”46 In Britain, as stated above, the importance placed on process-
ing trials in a speedy manner has a long history, although there too
criticism has emerged in certain cases.47 Other European countries
Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right to Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719 (2002)
[hereinafter Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter]; Douglas Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon:
The Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Colbert,
Thirty-Five Years].
42. Colbert, Coming Soon, supra note 41; Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter, supra note 41;
Colbert, Thirty-Five Years, supra note 41.
43. Colbert, Coming Soon, supra note 41; Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter, supra note 41;
Colbert, Thirty-Five Years, supra note 41. See also Surel Brady, Arrest without Prosecution and the Fourth
Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1 (2000).
44. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
45. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume
%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf.
46. See Carl Baar, Court Delay Data as Social Scientific Evidence: The Supreme Court of Canada and
‘Trial within a Reasonable Time,’ 19 JUST. SYS. J. 123 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court of
Canada’s case law, including R. v. Morin, (1992) 1 S.C.R. 771 and 11(b) of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, which codifies the right to a speedy trial.) See also MICHAEL A. CODE, TRIAL WITHIN A
REASONABLE TIME: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS IN
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (1992).
47. See supra text accompanying note 23. The criticism, in particular, has been in how the
government has handled terrorism-related cases, where it has not, in some matters, proceeded
speedily in bringing defendants to trial. In fact, in 2004 a British House of Lords held that the
government could not have an exception for terrorism-based cases. See Lizette Alvarez, Britain’s
Highest Court Overturns Anti-Terrorism Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/12/16/international/europe/16cnd-britain.html. As we say in the text and footnote (infra
note 51), however, in this study we focus on traditional criminal justice matters and not the
separate issue of terrorism and national security cases.
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
756 [Vol. 42
also have variations on such a provision.48 For example, with respect to
Germany, Richard Frase and Thomas Weigand have noted that “analo-
gous arrest and detention rules are found in both [the American and
German] systems, including similar prompt-appearance and speedy
trial rules designed to limit pre-conviction detention.”49 And there has
been work on the procedure of trials in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America.50
It should be noted that the literature of focus in this section has not
included a review of the work done on pre-trial detention in terrorism
and national security cases. Even in the United States, where the
Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that these types of
detainees must be afforded due process and a formal hearing, there
remains great debate within policy circles and scholarly communities as
to whether these cases should be handled within the criminal justice
system at all.51 For now, we sidestep this question, which we view as a
separate research inquiry, and next look at how jurisprudentially, and
then empirically, speedy trials have been few and far between in the
world’s largest democracy, India.
48. The Hauser Global Law Program at New York University has compiled an informative
bibliography on comparative criminal procedure generally. See Lyonette Louis-Jacques, Compara-
tive Criminal Procedure: A Bibliography, June/July 2007, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/
Comparative_Criminal_Procedure.htm. For sample of specific sources, see Fair Trial (Right to a),
LEGISLATIONLINE, http://www.legislationline.org/topics/topic/8 (last visited Mar. 28, 2011);
Norman Dorsen et al., Criminal Procedure (Due Process), in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 1043–
1154 (Norman Dorsen et al. eds., 2003); JOHN HATCHARD ET AL., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(1996).
49. See Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigand, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions? 18 B.C. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 317, 353 (1995).
50. See Louis-Jacques, supra note 48. Also for comparative criminal law and criminal proce-
dure see generally CRAIG M. BRADLEY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY (4th ed. 2007);
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID S. CLARK, & JOHN O. HALEY, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION, EUROPE,
LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA (1994); RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLDVIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005).
51. For a set of key U.S. Supreme Court national security cases, see Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). For a concise, insightful discussion on the evolution of
this area of the law, see BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY, & RABEA BENHALIM, THE EMERGING LAW
OF DETENTION: THE GUANTANAMO CASES AS LAWMAKING (2010), available at http://www.brookings.
edu//media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney/0122_guantanamo_
wittes_chesney.pdf. Also outside the scope of our study is the important area of detention in
immigration matters. However, for a discussion of this subject, see T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF,
DAVID A. MARTIN, & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY
881–924 (6th ed. 2008).
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II. THE INDIAN SPEEDY TRIAL LANDSCAPE
A. The Jurisprudence
India achieved independence from Britain in 1947, and its constitu-
tion came into force in 1950. As noted above, the drafters did not
include explicit language enshrining a defendant’s right to a speedy
trial.52 Still the notion of undertrial-prisoners being forced to serve
extended periods of confinement was part of the Indian Supreme
Court’s discourse as early as 1952—albeit in a slightly unexpected
manner. In Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja, the Court held that defen-
dants convicted under the pre-1950 criminal justice regime needed to
have their rights conform to the new Constitution’s fundamental
guarantees.53 In order to ensure their appearance at trial, however, the
Court then ordered that the defendants “be retained in custody as
undertrial-prisoners,”54 while the state prepared its new case.
Indeed, in the first two decades after independence, concern for the
length of time undertrial-detainees spent in prison did not seem to be a
focus for the Court. On repeated occasions, the Court maintained a low
threshold that the prosecution had to meet in order to justify the
continued detention of undertrial-prisoners.55 Moreover, between 1975
and 1977, when then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suspended the
Constitution and imposed Emergency Rule, the Court further buckled,
caving to the government’s demand specifically not to provide jailed
political opponents and others with speedy trials.56 It was only after the
lifting of the Emergency Rule and Mrs. Gandhi’s resounding defeat in
the following elections that the Court—in a concerted effort to regain
52. See Transcript of Constituent Assembly, supra note 20.
53. See Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. Bombay, (1952) S.C.R. 710.
54. Id.
55. See e.g., Madhu Limaye v. Magistrate, (1971) 2 S.C.R. 711 (holding that undertrials may be
detained in order to ensure that they appear in court for their eventual trial and where there may
be a threat to community peace if they are released); Ranbir, Singh Sehgal v. Punjab, (1962)
S.C.R. Supl. (1) 295 (noting that an undertrial prisoner is not necessarily exempt from being
placed in solitary confinement, although the reasons for being held in solitary must not be
arbitrary and must have a basis in law); Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent, (1958) S.C.R. 822
(holding that a valid rebuttal to a defendant’s claim of habeus corpus is for the prosecution simply
to provide a “production of the order or warrant for the apprehension and detention of an
undertrial”); Kanta Prashad v. Delhi Admin., (1958) S.C.R. 1218.
56. See e.g., GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE
(1999); UPENDRA BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS (Eastern Book Co.) (1980);
RAJEEV DHAVAN, THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: A SOCIO-LEGAL CRITIQUE OF ITS JURISTIC TECHNIQUES
(1977); S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING BORDERS AND ENFORCING LIMITS
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press) (2002); Krishnan, Scholarly Discourse, supra note 18.
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its legitimacy57—began fully examining the importance of not letting
the incarcerated languish behind bars.
The on-point decision in this regard came in the 1979 case of Hussain-
ara Khatoon v. Home Ministry.58 Written by arguably the most aggressive
protector of individual liberties in the Court’s post-Emergency period,
Justice P.N. Bhagwati, the Hussainara Khatoon opinion established for
the first time that a defendant had a fundamental right to a speedy trial
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.59 Fueled by media ac-
counts of the delays and horrendous conditions of various prisons,
Justice Bhagwati’s ruling ordered a massive revamping in how the
prison population was to be treated by the state. In the decision, the
Court mandated greater access to bail, more humane living standards,
and a significant reduction in time from arrest to trial.60 Furthermore,
of comparative interest, the judgment referenced U.S. criminal proce-
dure law in key sections.61 It premised its rationale on a ruling from a
year earlier, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.62 With Justice Bhagwati
also a main architect in that case, the Court stated that from that point
forward substantive due process would be formally recognized as a
fundamental aspect of the liberty provision of Article 21.63
57. See SATHE, supra note 56, at 106; Krishnan, Scholarly Discourse, supra note 18; see also Carl
Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operations and Limitations on the World’s Most Active
Judiciary, 19 POL’Y STUD. J. 140–50 (1990); Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Bread for the Poor:
Access to Justice and Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 795 (2005) [hereinafter
Galanter & Krishnan, Bread for the Poor]; Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyering for a Cause and Experiences
from Abroad, 94 CAL. L. REV. 575 (2006) [hereinafter Krishnan, Lawyering for a Cause].
58. (1979) 3 S.C.R. 169.
59. Id. Professor Upendra Baxi has written one of the most detailed and analytical account of
this case. As Baxi notes, in reality there were several iterations of the decision, involving six
different interim orders. (At the time of his writing, “the final orders in the writ petition . . .
[were] yet to emerge”). For a comprehensive review of these various interim rulings, see Upendra
Baxi, The Supreme Court Under Trial: Undertrials and the Supreme Court, 1 S.C.C. (JOUR.) 35, 35–51
(1980). It is important to note that while Justice Bhagwati was a crusader for the undertrials in the
Post-Emergency Era, he also was part of the majority in the infamous case (during the Emergency
Rule) that allowed the government to wield unfettered powers, including the power to abrogate
the constitution’s right to life and habeas corpus provisions. See A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shukla, A.I.R.
1976 S.C. 1207. We are grateful to Mr. Viplav Sharma for his insights on this important case.
60. See supra text accompanying note 59.
61. See Khatoon v. Home Ministry, (1979) 3 S.C.R. 169 (referencing the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and the United States Bail Reform Act of 1966 as well as “[t]he
experience of enlightened Bail Projects in the United States such as Manhattan Bail Project and
D. C. Bail Project shows that even without monetary bail it has been possible to secure the
presence of the accused at the trial in quite a large number of cases”).
62. See Maneka Gandhi v. India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621.
63. Id. Again, for a complete treatment of this crucial ruling, see SATHE, supra note 56.
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In the years that followed, subsequent judgments reiterated the
position set forth in Hussainara Khatoon. In 1980, for example, the
Court prohibited the continued handcuffing of incarcerated under-
trials unless there was a “clear and present danger of escape.”64 That
same year, Justice Bhagwati decried the delay and treatment of four
young boys—all under the age of twelve when arrested—who had been
jailed awaiting trial for over eight years.65 Bhagwati ordered an im-
mediate hearing. By 1981, the boys were finally acquitted of all charges
with the assistance of a committed grassroots activist, Vasudha Dhagam-
war.66
There were other emotionally wrenching cases involving the abuse of
juvenile undertrials that the Court sought to remedy during the
1980s.67 During this period, the Court dealt with the ghastly blinding of
undertrial-prisoners in a northern Indian jail,68 as well as whether
undertrials could have the time already spent waiting in prison count
towards a sentence once rendered.69 With respect to the latter, in 1985
64. Shukla v. Delhi Admin., (1980) 3 S.C.R. 855.
65. Pehadiya v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 939 (noting that the undertrial problem was a “crying
shame upon our adjudicatory system . . . .” Also note that the decision was made in December of
1980 but reported in many casebooks in 1981—thus the Supreme Court Reports citation.). For a
moving, detailed account of a leading advocate who worked on behalf of the boys in this case, see
VASUDHA DHAGAMWAR, ROLE AND IMAGE OF LAW IN INDIA: THE TRIBAL EXPERIENCE 241–258 (2006).
Also see, Bir v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1470 (where the Court (with Justice Bhagwati again part of
the panel) explicitly ruled that state high courts (in this case Bihar’s) should ensure “that there
are no undertrial prisoners who are detained in jail for more than 18 months without their trial
having been commenced, either before the magistrate or the court of sessions, and if there are
such undertrial prisoners, the High Court will take steps for the purpose of expediting the trial of
such undertrial prisoners”).
66. See DHAGAMWAR, supra note 65, at 248. Interestingly, Dhagamawar notes in this chapter
of her book that she was inspired to champion the boys’ case after seeing the tremendous efforts
taken by Justice Bhagwati in Hussainara Khatoon, as well as in another case, Batra v. Delhi
Administration, (1979) 1 S.C.R. 392 (1978), where the Court there held that a prisoner who had
been savagely beaten required humane treatment and immediate due process in the criminal
justice system.
67. See, e.g., Munna v. Upper Pradesh, (1982) 3 S.C.R. 47 (accepting a writ petition and
ordering further investigation of the extensive allegations of sexual abuse of juvenile undertrials);
see also Supreme Court Legal Aid Comm. v. India, (1989) 2 S.C.R. 60 (ordering various states to
collect data on the numbers of undertrial children in prison); Suri v. Delhi Admin., (1988)
2 S.C.R. 234 (dealing with the inhumane conditions to which juveniles in Delhi’s Tihar Jail were
exposed).
68. See Yadav v. Bihar, (1982) 3 S.C.R. 533.
69. The Court, for instance, initially said no. See Kartar Singh v. Haryana, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 445,
where the Court argued that because the defendant’s sentence was for life, counting the
undertrial waiting period towards such a sentence would make no sense. But see Sethi v. Bihar,
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the Court answered affirmatively, holding that even defendants sen-
tenced to life imprisonment could receive such an “offset.”70
Over the past two decades, the Court has furthered its commitment
to enhancing the rights of the undertrials. In a landmark 1994 case, the
Court ruled that for those undertrial-defendants accused of narcotics
violations who had spent “half [the time] of the maximum punishment
provided for the offence,”71 “any further deprivation of personal liberty
would be violative of the fundamental right visualized by Article 21.”72
Two years later, in two cases, the Court reiterated time limits for
incarceration of undertrials.73 The Court, in Shri Rama Murthy v. State of
Karnataka, noted that given that the state had 193,240 people incarcer-
ated—of which 137,838 were undertrials—justice would best be served
by simply releasing the undertrials.74
In the 2000s, the jurisprudence of the Indian Supreme Court has
continued to emphasize the need to protect undertrial-prisoners’
rights.75 While there has been the occasional case where the Court has
opposed an undertrial-prisoner’s petition,76 these instances have been
A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 339 (noting in an obscure line in the case that under “Section 428 of the CrPC
1973 that the period during which an accused has been in jail as an under-trial prisoner should be
taken into account for the purpose of computing the period of the sentence . . . ”). Two years later
the Supreme Court overturned Singh. See infra note 70.
70. Bhagirath v. Delhi Admin., (1985) 3 S.C.R. 743. Practically, this issue would arise in those
situations where a defendant was sentenced to life but had a possibility of parole.
71. Supreme Court Legal Aid Comm. v. India, (1994) Supp. 4 S.C.R. 386.
72. Id. For two even more current cases re-stating this principle, see Maharashtra v. Ali, (2001)
3 S.C.R. 600; Saxena v. India, (2008) 63 A.C.C. 115.
73. See Upadhyay v. Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 3 S.C.C. 422; Common Cause v. India, (1996)
Supp. 2 S.C.R. 196. But c.f. Rao v. Karnataka, (2002) 3 S.C.R. 68 (overruling the Common Cause
decision, noting that judges have to determine what a speedy trial is in terms of the “facts and
circumstances of the case before them”).
74. Shri Rama Murthy v. Karnataka, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1739. Note, while this decision was
handed down in 1997, the data that the Court was working off of was from statistics taken in 1993.
75. See, e.g., Parekh v. Cent. Bureau of Investigations, (2009) 15 S.C.R. 1105 (reiterating the
principle that time served as an undertrial should count towards any formal sentence received);
Upadhyay v. Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 1946 (decrying the horrid situation of children who
are dependent on their mothers—who are undertrial-prisoners—having to stay in prison with
their parent simply as a means of surviving); Sanjay Alias Bablu Alias Keja v. Gujarat, (2002)
10 S.C.C. 403 (granting of release, on bail, to undertrial prisoner who had been languishing since
1998 awaiting trial); Maharashtra v. Mubarak Ali, (2001) 3 S.C.R. 600 (holding that the undertrial
prisoner, under section 428, can have his time served counted towards two separate criminal
sentences imposed upon him). For further cases during the 2000s that deal with the Court’s
jurisprudence on the undertrials, see Appendix 1.
76. See, e.g., Sarkar v. Ranjan, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 972. Here the Court had shown hostility
towards an undertrial prisoner who has disobeyed internal prison rules, noting that “[t]he
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few in the post-Emergency era. Yet, with all of these favorable judicial
pronouncements, the question then becomes: have these rulings trans-
lated into tangible results? We examine this question in the next
section.
B. The Empirics
According to the latest 2010 data from the Indian government, there
are roughly 430,000 people incarcerated in the country, with a startling
70% (300,000) who are undertrial-prisoners.77 These figures are in the
aggregate, so in order to contextualize this information consider the
most recent disaggregated data (from the Ministry of Home Affairs)
from the end of 2007. This information reveals that the total number of
undertrial-prisoners in the twenty-eight states and seven union territo-
ries (UTs) then was 250,727.78 Given the government’s most recent
2010 data, that number has grown by nearly an astonishing 50,000
people in just over two years. This fact alone intimates that the
Supreme Court’s various judgments have simply not been executed.
Further, over one-third of the 2007 undertrial-population (88,312) was
illiterate. And when combined with those with less than a tenth grade
education, that percentage skyrocketed to approximately 80% (196,954)
of the entire 2007 undertrial-population.79
Next, consider additional data from the end of 2007. What this
information displays is that a disproportionate percentage of sched-
uled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward classes (OBCs)
made-up the undertrial-population, with nearly two-thirds of the total
number of undertrials coming from one of these three communities.80
fundamental right of an undertrial prisoner under Article 21 of the Constitution is not absolute.”
Id. at ¶ 21.
77. See 92,000 Undertrial Prisoners Released Across India, supra note 13.
78. The data come from the Indian government’s Ministry of Home Affairs and are compiled
by IndiaStat.com, a sophisticated web service. State-wise Demographic Particulars of Untertrial Prisoners
in Jails in India, INDIASTAT.COM, http://www.indiastat.com/crimeandlaw/6/whatsnew.aspx [here-
inafter State-wise Demographic Particulars]. Unfortunately, the Ministry’s most recent disaggregated
on-line data is from the end of 2007. The Indian government also has a body known as the
National Crime Records Bureau. However, the most recent on-line disaggregated data available
there is from 2006; thus we rely on the former source here for this study.
79. State-wise Demographic Particulars, supra note 78.
80. In particular, the data show that 63% of the total number of prisoners is from Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and OBCs. The breakdown in number is: for Scheduled Castes,
54,324/241,413; Scheduled Tribes, 29,941/241,413; OBCs: 68,115/241,413. (Note also that the
total number of undertrials, 241,413, is lower than the total number of undertrials from footnote
78, which was 250,727. Presumably this difference is because there are unreported statistics in the
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These three groups, whose classifications are officially denoted and
recognized in India, have long been formally identified by the govern-
ment as deserving constitutional and statutory protection as well as
affirmative public benefits, due to the historic, socio-economic, politi-
cal, and religious discrimination they have faced.81
Moreover, from a state-by-state perspective (excluding the union
territories), in all but five states (Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu &
Kashmir, Karnataka, and West Bengal) at least 50% of the 2007
undertrial totals, respectively, are from scheduled castes, scheduled
tribes, or OBCs. Of course, that there may be variation among and
within these groups, politically and socio-economically, in their respec-
tive states is obvious. But, according to a highly respected observer who
closely tracks this data and is intimately familiar with the undertrial
problem in India, there is a palpable sense among lawyers, rights
activists, and government officials that lower castes are unfairly tar-
geted by the criminal justice system.82
There are other Home Ministry data (again from end-2007) worth
discussing, as well. For example, the criminal justice system is in large
part guided by what is known as the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which
defines misdemeanors and felonies and prescribes their respective
penalties. This body of laws had a long history,83 but interestingly for
our purposes, by more than a two-to-one margin, there are more
undertrial-prisoners facing murder charges (54,245 defendants) than
any other crime. (The next highest number is over 24,623, and they are
those facing theft charges).84
Supplementing the IPC are various local and state criminal laws, as
well as special laws that have been passed by the central government.
Here, the largest number of end-2007 undertrial-prisoners held under
former (namely from Delhi, where the difference between 250,727 and 241,413 is 9,314, which is
the exact number of undertrials listed for Delhi.) For information on the data, see text
accompanying supra note 78. See also State-wise Demographic Particulars of Undertrial Prisoners in
Jails of India—(Caste Data) (2007), INDIASTAT.COM, (On file with author.)
81. For a classic treatment on the issue of law and caste in India, see MARC GALANTER,
COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND BACKWARD CLASSES IN INDIA (1984). Of course, this subject has
been discussed extensively in the literature. For a recent, up-to-date bibliography on the subject of
caste, see TIMOTHY LUBIN, DONALD R. DAVIS & JAYANTH K. KRISHNAN, HINDUISM AND LAW (2010).
82. Interview with Civil Society Official (anonymity requested) (May 17, 2010) (on file with
author).
83. For a discussion of this issue, see generally HARI OM MARATHA, LAW OF SPEEDY TRIAL: JUSTICE
DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED (2008).
84. See State-wise Number of Undertrial Prisoners by Type of IPC Offences in India, Part I, II, and III
(2007), INDIASTAT.COM (on file with author).
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these statues is those who face drug charges under the Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act (11,108).85 Next, there are
nearly 10,000 individuals accused of violating the country’s Arms Act,
followed by over 6,000 charged under the existing Excise Act.86
Finally, consider that of the 250,727 undertrial-prisoners from end-
2007, 103,624 had been waiting for a trial for three months or fewer,
and another 52,476 had been waiting up to six months. At the other
end of the spectrum, there were 1,891 inmates who had spent more
than five years in detention, which is .008% of the total undertrial-
population.87
At first glance, these figures might be ones that defenders would use
to rebut the frequent criticisms made of India’s criminal justice system.
The argument might be that although it is never good to have people
spending even one day more in prison than necessary, that 62% of the
undertrial-population is doing so for no more than six months defies
the stereotype that the Indian penal process is a proverbial black hole.
Moreover, that only a miniscule percentage is detained for more than
five years—while, again, troubling—is not nearly as high a number as
what is often portrayed. In August 2010, the Chief Justice of India
vigorously made this point, adding that “all trial judges have done an
excellent job in maintaining a high disposal of cases.”88
In fact, these data deserve greater scrutiny. For one thing, there is no
85. See State-wise Number of Undertrial Prisoners by Type of Offences under Special and Local Laws
(SLL) in India, Part I, Part II, Part III (2007), INDIASTAT.COM (on file with author).
86. Id. For an insightful, although critical review of an essay on this subject, where the
reviewer highlights how statistics on undertrials must include special laws, which we do, see Bikram
Jeet Batra, A Weak Look at Judicial Reforms, INDIA TOGETHER (2007), http://www.indiatogether.org/
2007/may/rvw-judreform.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2011) (critiquing Debashis Chakraborty,
Arnab Kumar Hazra, & Pavel Chakraborty, Crime Deterrence and the Need for Reforms: An Analysis of
Indian States, in JUDICIAL REFORMS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND ASPECTS (Arnab Kumar Hazra & Bibek
Debroy eds., 2007).
87. See State-wise Number of Undertrial Prisoners by Period of Detention in India, Part I and Part II
(2007), INDIASTAT.COM (on file with author).
88. See Litigation Statistics Debate Continue: All India Seminar on Judicial Reforms Looks at Real
Statistics and Real Numbers, BAR & BENCH, Aug. 2, 2010, http://barandbench.com/brief/2/882/
litigation-statistics-debate-continue-all-india-seminar-on-judicial-reforms-looks-at-real-statistics-
and-real-numbers654425 (with the Chief Justice further noting: “For years I have been listening to
speaker after speaker . . . slamming the judiciary for mounting arrears. They must know [in India,
for statistics purposes] filing of a case today becomes a pending case tomorrow. But, is that an
arrear? Statistics reveal that 60% of the cases pending in trial courts were less than one year old.
So, if we take a realistic look at the arrears and exclude those pending for just one year, then the
arrears are only one crore [i.e. 10,000,000] cases,” rather than the 30,000,000 that is frequently
cited).
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information on what types of charges the 62%, detained-for-under-six-
month group, are facing. Otherwise put, this time frame matters little
to the person who is being held for a crime that carries a maximum
sentence of thirty days but remains incarcerated for five months.
Similarly, for the 1,891 prisoners awaiting trial for more than five years,
the question must be asked: who are these people? As stated above,
there are over 52,000 people currently facing murder charges. Might
all 1,891 of these people be murder-defendants? (Perhaps—and if they
are indeed guilty that may serve as some odd form of Machiavellian
rationalization justifying their current status. But a priori how do we
know beyond a reasonable doubt that they are guilty?) And what about
the other 50,000 murder-charged defendants; where are they in the
process? What about the people who are charged with much less
serious offences; might they be included within this 1,891 figure?89
Finally, there are a host of other questions presented and issues
unresolved. For instance, how many of these undertrial-prisoners have
received a bail hearing? Typically, when an arrest of an individual
is made, that person must be produced in front of a magistrate within
twenty-four hours.90 At that time a determination will be made on
bail. Regardless of the bail decision, the police are supposed to con-
tinue to investigate further in order to determine whether a formal
“charge-sheet”91 should be filed with prosecutors, who then will assess
whether to proceed to trial. What the data do not tell us is if the
statistics include or exclude those who have been denied bail but
who have yet to be “charge-sheeted.” In other words, if the figures
from the government only represent defendants who have formally
received word from prosecutors that they (the defendants) will be
tried—and there are indeed non-“charge-sheeted” individuals languish-
ing behind bars—then there is a serious undercounting of the inmate
population.92
Ultimately, these empirics starkly illustrate the undertrial situation in
India, with the preceding questions highlighting how the scenario may
89. Given the number of such cases the Supreme Court alone has heard in the past, the
answer seems to be, disturbingly, yes. For a review of these cases, see supra Part II.A.
90. See FAQ’s About Arrest/Bail, MAHARASHTRA STATE POLICE, http://mahapolice.gov.in/
mahapolice/jsp/temp/arrestfaq.jsp (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) (detailing procedures in Maharash-
tra under country’s criminal procedure code).
91. See id.
92. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, SEVENTY-EIGHTH REPORT: CONGESTION OF UNDER-TRIAL
PRISONERS IN JAILS 5 (1979), http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/Report78.pdf (defining
“undertrial prisoners in a wide sense even to include persons who are in judicial custody on
remand during investigation”) [hereinafter LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA].
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be even worse than the data suggest. Obviously we are not alone in
recognizing this dilemma. In the next section we review and evaluate
the various initiatives that have been made over the years to address
India’s inmate predicament, and thereafter we add our own set of
proposals to the debate.
III. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE? PROPOSALS AND REFORM INITIATIVES
Support for providing speedy trials for defendants within the Indian
criminal justice process is not new. The late professor, Jagmohan
Singh, authored the most detailed, scholarly, and empirically rich book
on the undertrial situation to date.93 Singh focused his analysis exclu-
sively on the experiences of the northern Indian state of Kashmir.94
The opening chapter of his study interestingly describes how as early as
ancient Hindu times, adjudicators, or those who were known as the
“law givers were not only concerned with [the] frequent granting of
adjournments [i.e. continuances], but also with the time period for
which an adjournment could be granted.”95 Singh then goes on to
argue that in ancient India, as well as subsequently in the Islamic
Mughal period (particularly between the 16th–18th centuries), the
providing of speedy trials was “held in high esteem”96 by the various
rulers of the day.97 Yet, towards the end of the Mughal dynasty, the
criminal justice process became “lax, sluggish, corrupt, crude archaic,
inhumane and over-burden[ed],”98 and it was this system that the
British inherited during the mid to late 1700s.99
As Singh and others have discussed, initially the British, through the
East India Company, sought to alter certain aspects of the existing
93. See JAGMOHAN SINGH, RIGHT TO SPEEDY JUSTICE FOR UNDERTRIAL PRISONERS (1997).
94. Id. Note, while in the West, Kashmir is the frequently used name to describe the state; its
official name is Jammu & Kashmir.
95. See id. at 20.
96. See id. at 29.
97. Note, while there is little actual empirical evidence to confirm this type of view, there is
jurisprudential literature that discusses the trial process in those ancient days, as well as the
substantive equity of the laws themselves. See generally ROBERT LINGAT, LES SOURCES DU DROIT DANS
LE SYSTE`ME TRADITIONNEL DE L’INDE [THE CLASSICAL LAW OF INDIA] 67, 219–22 (J. Duncan M. Derret
trans., Munshiram Manoharlal Publ’s First Indian Ed. 1993) (1973) (discussion of laws favoring
certain groups over others (e.g., Brahmins) in ancient India); 3 P. V. KANE, HISTORY OF
DHARMASASTRA 246–410 (1946); VARDHAMANA UPADHYAYA, DANDAVIVEKA (Bhabatosh Bhattacharya
trans., Asiatic Society Bibliotheca Indica 301, 1973).
98. See SINGH, supra note 93, at 30.
99. See id.
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Muslim law that governed the region.100 Attempts were then made to
regularize and professionalize police conduct; and there were reforms
by Lord Hastings and Lord Cornwallis to create more independence
for the courts and outlets for appeal.101 But by the end of the 18th
century delays continued to plague the criminal courts.102 A lack of a
uniform set of criminal laws throughout the colony, less-than-
competent adjudicators, corruption, and insufficient defense counsel
were some of the contributing factors.103 Largely to address these
problems, the second half of the 19th century saw the passage of the
Indian Penal Code (1862) and the Indian Criminal Procedure Code
(1882).104 The British established a series of Law Commissions to study
how best to ensure that defendants would have their day in court.105
Throughout the 20th century, and during the first decade of the
21st, there have been various proposals offered to address the backlog
in criminal trials. For example, “the first comprehensive study of prison
problems was made by the Indian Jails Committee of 1919–1920.”106
Relating to the undertrials, in particular, the Committee urged the
Crown to sequester these individuals from the convicted and reiterated
the need to provide them with preliminary hearings and a trial in a
timely fashion.107 In several subsequent investigations by the colonial
regime and then the post-independence state,108 similar recommenda-
100. See id. at 31.
101. See id. at 31–32.
102. See id. at 33–34. Note that these delays were also problems created by the British in their
insertion of numerous interlocutory appeals into the procedure codes. In part, the British did this
because some of the lower courts were staffed with Indians, and the British government wanted to
ensure that potentially adverse rulings from these local judges could be appealed to its own
highest court, the Privy Council, in London. Interlocutory appeals, in other words, served as a
check by the colonial rulers over how Indians were administering justice within the courts. See
Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2189
(2007). There will be a discussion of this point infra Part IV.
103. See SINGH, supra note 93, at 31–36.
104. See id. at 34.
105. See id. at 35–36. See also SURENDRA KUMAR PACHAURI, PRISONERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 77–83
(1999).
106. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 3; see also MITCHELL P. ROTH, PRISONS AND
PRISON SYSTEMS: A GLOBAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 133 (2006); R.K. SAXENA, COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS
INITIATIVE, PRISON VISITING SYSTEMS IN INDIA: COMMUNITY INTERVENTION INTO PRISONS 1–2 (2005),
http://humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/prisons/prisons_visiting_system_in%20India.pdf.
107. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 3 (outlining Indian Jails Committee
Report). See generally F.A. BARKER, THE MODERN PRISON SYSTEM OF INDIA, A REPORT TO THE
DEPARTMENT: THE PROGRESS OF PRISON REFORM IN INDIA DURING THE TWENTY YEARS FOLLOWING THE
PUBLICATION OF THE REPORT OF THE 1919–1920 INDIAN JAILS COMMITTEE (1944).
108. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 3–4 (listing the different investigations).
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tions were promoted.109
In 1979, a highly respected four-member governmental law com-
mission prescribed numerous suggestions regarding the “congestion
of undertrial-prisoners in jails.”110 Then in 1983, another government-
commissioned panel, the Mulla Committee, devoted a chapter of its
three-year study on Indian prisons to the situation of “undertrials
and other un-convicted prisoners.”111 Further, there have been several
directives for improving the undertrial predicament by the Indian
National Human Rights Commission, a governmentally created body
established in 1993 that has as part of its mandate the goal of ensuring
that all detainees in custody are treated humanely and in accordance
with the law.112
Within each of these undertrial reports, it is striking to see how many
points are reiterations of points made in predecessor committees.
Found in these various government papers are the following common
threads:
● increasing the number of judges in the criminal courts in order to
reduce overburdened, delay-ridden dockets;113
● enhancing the technological and infrastructural facilities of the
courts themselves in order to make the courtroom process more
efficient;114
109. See ROTH, supra note 106, at 133–34. It is important to note here that these commissioned-
reports and enacted-statutes typically focused on defendants who had already been convicted,
with the argument being that if the criminal justice system overall were improved so too would the
plight of the undertrial population. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92.
110. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 1. An important predecessor to this
committee was the 77th Law Commission, which too studied the Indian penal system, albeit
comparatively less so with respect to the specific issue of undertrials. This report is cited
extensively in the Seventy-Eighth Report. See id. passim. Note also, importantly, that a review of the
commissions’ work is discussed by the CHRI. See R. SREEKUMAR, COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS
INITIATIVE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR UNDERTRIAL PRISONERS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 5–9 (2002),
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/artres/Access%20to%20Justice%20for%20Undetrial%20
Prisoners.pdf. We will be covering the important contributions of this organization in the next
section.
111. See GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, ALL INDIA COMM. ON JAIL REFORMS
1980–83, REPORT para. 12.17.1 (1983); see also SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 5.
112. See FAQ’s About NHRC, NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, http://nhrc.nic.in/faq.htm (last
visited Mar. 13, 2011) (noting one of its key charges is to “visit, under intimation to the State
Government, any jail or any other institution under the control of the State Government, where
persons are detained or lodged for purposes of treatment, reformation or protection [and] to
study the living condition of the inmates and make recommendations thereon”).
113. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 12; SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 6.
114. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 12–13; SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 5–7.
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● promoting greater integrity by the police while concurrently en-
couraging the police to accelerate the investigation process so that
cases do not languish and evidence is not neglected from being
collected;115
● maintaining the continuity of criminal cases from one judge to
another when the presiding judge is transferred mid-case (as is com-
mon in a civil service-based judicial system) to a different court;116
● discontinuing the frequent judicial practice of granting the govern-
ment unnecessary adjournments;117
● expanding the bail-opportunities for defendants charged with less
serious crimes;118 and
● segregating undertrial-prisoners from those who have already been
convicted.119
In an ideal world, the implementation of the above recommenda-
tions would help to alleviate the plight of the undertrial dilemma in
India. In our view, the fact that a number of these proposals have failed
to translate into actual policy changes—despite being repeatedly advo-
cated over the past many decades—highlights a lack of political will,
insufficient devotion of resources to make such substantive alterations,
and no uniform enforcement of those few initiatives that have been
codified. Such problems are all too familiar to those who study the
Indian legal system.
Yet one recent initiative, from the current Indian Law Minister,
Veerappa Moily, has indeed broken from the traditional mold by deci-
sively implementing a results-oriented policy. In early 2010, Moily an-
nounced that his office would begin ordering the release of those under-
trial-prisoners charged with petty crimes who had been incarcerated
roughly for one-half of the time that a formal sentence would have
brought were there a conviction.120 Within six months, he stated his
115. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 13; SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 5–6.
116. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 14.
117. See Id. at 16; SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 5–6.
118. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 17–22; SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 7.
One point that is emphasized by the Seventy-Eighth Law Commission is that there needs to be an
expansion of the surety principle for less-serious offenders. In other words, in these cases bail
ought to be provided, but as the Commission discusses, where the defendant fails to appear, its
argument is that the defendant should be found automatically guilty of an offense—a sweeping
conclusion indeed. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 21–23.
119. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 25; SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 5.
120. See Vaibhav Vats, 136,217 Prisoners, in for Petty Crimes, Have Been Set Free in a Drive that Ends
in a Few Days. Will Freedom Reform Them? Or Will They Come Right Back to Jail?, TEHELKA, July 31, 2010,
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main46.asp?filenameNe310710undertrial.asp.
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objective was to reduce the 300,000 undertrial population by two-thirds.121
And indeed, as of July 2010, as indicated by Table 1 (which includes for
some table-cells only approximated figures provided by the data-source), a
sizable number of undertrial prisoners appear to have been released as
part of Moily’s initiative.122 This is a move in the right direction.
121. See Gyanant Singh, Moily Promises to Free Two Lakh Undertrials, INDIA TODAY, Jan. 26,
2010, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/80972/India/Moilypromisestofree2
lakhundertrials.html; see also Number of Undertrials to Be Reduced by 2/3: Moily, THAINDIAN NEWS,
Jan. 25, 2010, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/number-of-undertrials-to-be-
reduced-by-23rd-moily-lead_100309563.html.
122. See Dhananjay Mahapatra, Moily’s Mission Undertrial: Over Two Lakh Released from Jails,
TIMES OF INDIA, July 23, 2010, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-07-23/india/
28311017_1_lakh-undertrials-overcrowded-jails-early-release.
123. Id. Note, the data on Andhra Pradesh is only provided as “over 14,000.” Id. Similarly, the
total number of released is only provided as “over 2 lakh.” Id. (One lakh in India is the equivalent
TABLE 1.123














Jammu & Kashmir 1,476
Total for other states not disaggregated 45,387
Total number of undertrials government claims
have been released 200,000
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Still, despite the Law Minister’s encouraging engagement, there are
nevertheless unresolved issues that remain regarding his plan. For
example, how many of these individuals have actually been freed
completely? How many are simply out on bail? For those out on bail,
do they have counsel or other means of representation? What was the
process for determining whether a detainee could be released? For
those who were not released but remain in prison awaiting their day
in court, how much longer until their trial dates? And perhaps most
importantly, assuming that the number of undertrials continues to fall,
what next? Are measures in place to ensure that such unacceptable
excesses do not re-occur?
In order to supplement the above-mentioned proposals with details
that might help structurally improve the undertrial problem—and in
the process answer the above queries—in the next and final section,
we draw upon the few empirically rigorous, qualitative studies that exist
as well as interview data collected during the summer of 2010. We then
offer certain remedies that add more specificity to the broad, para-
metrical recommendations of previous government commissions.
IV. WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE? PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) is a leader in
extensively analyzing the perils facing undertrial-prisoners. Many of its
reports on this subject are now a decade old (although it maintains an
active website with links to ongoing prison studies more generally).124
Still, its previous proposals remain relevant. To be sure, CHRI gives due
deference to the above-cited government commissions and their recom-
mendations.125 However, the organization advances the dialogue by
both privileging certain solutions over others and by adding needed
substance.
For example, while of course agreeing that undertrial-detainees
ought not be left to languish indefinitely, the CHRI also calls for a
number of particular measures to ensure that the criminal process
moves forward in a timely manner. First, it proposes implementing
greater use of technology as a means of addressing the lack and
of 100,000.) Thus, to compute the number for the cell “Total for other states not disaggregated,”
we used the rounded numbers of 14,000 and 200,000 respectively to arrive at 45,387.
124. See COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org
(last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (follow “Prison Reforms” hyperlink).
125. See SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 5–9 (thoroughly summarizing past recommendations).
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overcrowding of jails within the country.126 Recent data indicate that
there are some 1,340 jails available throughout India to house the
430,000 individuals currently being incarcerated.127 Based on the
government’s statistics from 2007, the problem of overcrowding in jails
is apparent. Table 2 shows the troubling situation.
126. Id. at 5–7, 12–13.
127. See Facts and Figures, COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, http://www.human
rightsinitiative.org/index.php?optioncom_content&viewarticle&id109&Itemid122 (last
visited Mar. 14, 2011).
128. Prison Statistics India 2007, NAT’L CRIMES RECORD BUREAU, GOV’T OF INDIA, http://
ncrb.nic.in/PSI2007/Full/Prison2007Final.pdf.
TABLE 2.128
CAPACITY IN JAILS, POPULATION OF INMATES AND OCCUPANCY RATE IN



















1 ANDHRA PRADESH 12710 15045 118.4 124.2
2
ARUNACHAL
PRADESH* – – – –
3 ASSAM 6357 8705 136.9 134.3
4 BIHAR 29598 39638 133.9 180.8
5 CHHATTISGARH 5407 10451 193.3 195.5
6 GOA 356 366 102.8 106.7
7 GUJARAT 6519 11842 181.7 206.9
8 HARYANA 10482 13093 124.9 119.8
9
HIMACHAL
PRADESH 1131 1435 126.9 133.1
10
JAMMU &
KASHMIR 3050 2299 75.4 73.2
11 JHARKHAND 10738 17936 167.0 183.2
12 KARNATAKA 12144 13052 107.5 107.7
13 KERALA 3765 6742 179.1 129.5
14 MADHYA PRADESH 20448 32712 160.0 158.0
15 MAHARASHTRA 20901 25892 123.9 128.1
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As the data indicate, in the vast majority of states and union territo-
ries the prison population within most of the jails far exceeds the
holding capacity. In places like Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Delhi,
the jails are astoundingly overcrowded, by 201.3%, 193.3%, and 185.7%





















16 MANIPUR 970 444 45.8 37.2
17 MEGHALAYA 530 665 125.5 119.4
18 MIZORAM 1163 941 80.9 68.9
19 NAGALAND 1290 501 38.8 55.2
20 ORISSA 10603 15368 144.9 160.5
21 PUNJAB 11742 15972 136.0 134.1
22 RAJASTHAN 17554 14687 83.7 79.7
23 SIKKIM 196 226 115.3 186.0
24 TAMILNADU 20321 16599 81.7 106.6
25 TRIPURA 1065 1317 123.7 128.6
26 UTTAR PRADESH 37843 76180 201.3 184.8
27 UTTARAKHAND 2139 2709 126.6 155.3
28 WEST BENGAL 20222 18598 92.0 92.2
TOTAL (STATES) 269244 363415 135.0 140.2
29 A & N ISLANDS 309 413 133.7 112.0
30 CHANDIGARH 1000 501 50.1 43.8
31 D & N HAVELI 60 28 46.7 55.0
32 DAMAN & DIU 120 66 55.0 45.0
33 DELHI 6250 11605 185.7 214.4
34 LAKSHADWEEP 16 22 137.5 0.0
35 PONDICHERRY 305 346 113.4 102.3
TOTAL (UTs) 8060 12981 161.1 180.0
TOTAL (ALL-INDIA) 277304 376396 135.7 141.4
* Jails do not exist in this state.
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also woefully inadequate, as past research has shown.129 Further, there
are a sheer lack of vehicles and personnel to transport the incarcerated
from the jails to the courts.130 For these reasons, the CHRI has strongly
advocated the use of technology to process currently held under-
trials.131 This might occur via video conferencing, whereby proceed-
ings could take place “between jails and courts”132 in as expeditious a
manner as possible.
Second, the CHRI also supports the creation of a statutorily based
committee devoted solely to monitoring these detainees’ rights.133 The
committee would be comprised of a local judge, a prosecutor, a police
officer and two other law enforcement officials.134 The committee’s
sole charge would consist of overseeing the prisoners’ well-being and
facilitating their cases through the criminal justice process. Encourag-
ingly, there is preliminary evidence of such a body having been created
and successfully operating in the southern state of Tamil Nadu.135
A third initiative would be to have judges travel to the jails and
adjudicate proceedings within the confines of the undertrials’ cells.
Such “jail-adalats” have been instituted in various parts of the country,
and there is writing on their performance.136 We hasten to mention
two caveats that ought to accompany such hearings, however. First, the
manner in which these proceedings take place should be closely
129. For a discussion of this point, see Galanter & Krishnan, Bread for the Poor, supra note 57.
It is also important to consider Nick Robinson, Too Many Cases, FRONTLINE, Jan. 3–16, 2009,
http://www.frontline.in/fl2601/stories/20090116260108100.htm (arguing that, at least at the
Supreme Court level, adding more judges to reduce the backlogs of cases are “makeshift
solutions,” and that it is instead “acceptance rates, and more importantly the type of cases the
court is accepting, that create its current backlog and character”). This point deserves serious
consideration, again for the Supreme Court, and likely the upper judiciary overall. Whether
changes within the lower judiciary of how cases are taken in and handled once they are in the
system would appreciably lower the backlog—compared to, say, adding more judges—is an
interesting empirical question to which we do not know the answer with certainty. However, given
that sessions courts are the courts of first instance in many criminal matters, it seems likely that
adding more judges and courtrooms would readily assist in alleviating the current undertrial
problem.
130. See SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 3, 12.
131. Id. at 5–7, 12–13.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id.
134. Id. Our proposal would add members of the criminal defense bar and NGO-lawyers, as well.
135. Id. at 6.
136. See e.g., PRITI BHARADWAJ, COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATVE (CHRI), LIBERTY AT
THE COST OF INNOCENCE: A REPORT ON JAIL ADALATS IN INDIA (2009), http://www.humanrights
initiative.org/publications/prisons/liberty_at_the_cost_of_innocence.pdf.
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monitored. Past research on other forms of alternative dispute mecha-
nisms in the Indian context casts questions on the predictability,
fairness, and even-handedness in which justice is adjudicated.137 The
second related concern is the extent to which undertrial-prisoners are
cajoled into taking guilty pleas in exchange for being released from
incarceration.138 For defendants who accept such a condition, does
the stigma of being found guilty travel back with these individuals to
their respective communities? More research is needed to understand
whether Indian undertrial-defendants who are released encounter
such problems.139
This need for greater information leads us to build upon the work of
the CHRI and others to provide our set of recommendations on the
undertrial problem in India. In part, these points reflect the findings
collected from those who have present-day experiences within the
trenches of India’s criminal justice process. They also emphasize that
much remains unknown about the status of undertrial-prisoners, and
how any future proposal must be based on rigorously conducted
empirical research.
One important question revolves around the issue of corruption and
the extent to which undertrial-prisoners are arrested and detained
because of it. That corruption is an endemic problem within Indian
society (particularly among the police) has long been documented by
scholars, civil society organizations, and the government itself.140 As
these studies have recognized, tracking, proving, and eradicating cor-
ruption from daily life in India are enormous challenges, especially in
a society where the disparities in wealth are so stark.141 The findings
resoundingly confirm that corruption is a main impediment to the
137. See BHARADWAJ, supra note 136; see also Galanter & Krishnan, Bread for the Poor, supra note
57. For general literature on this subject of alternative dispute resolution forums, see MAARTEN
BAVINCK, MARINE RESOUCE MANAGEMENT: CONFLICT AND REGULATION IN THE FISHERIES OF THE
COROMANDEL COAST (2002); MOOG, supra note 19; ANIRUDH KRISHNA, ACTIVE SOCIAL CAPITAL:
TRACING THE ROOTS OF DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY (2002); PREM CHOUDHRY, Caste Panchayats
and the Policing of Marriage in Haryana: Enforcing Kinship and Territorial Exagamy, 38 CONTRIBUTIONS
TO INDIAN SOC. 1–41 (2004); Robert S. Moog, Conflict and Compromise: The Politics of Lok Adalats in
Varanasi District, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 545 (1991).
138. See BHARADWAJ, supra note 136. One U.S.-based scholar who works on such important
norm-based questions is Professor Josh Bowers. For a sample of his work in this area, see Josh
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Decision not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655
(2010); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008).
139. For a discussion of this point, see BHARADWAJ, supra note 136.
140. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 18.
141. Id.
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country’s development. Indeed, it is also a key factor exacerbating the
perpetuation of undertrial-prisoners within the criminal justice process
in three specific ways.
First, police at the local levels in India often engage in the practice of
street-sweeps, arrests of individuals for petty misdemeanor viola-
tions.142 Subsequently, it is not uncommon for those being detained to
be asked to pay a bribe, “karcha-pani,”143 to have their arrests waived.
Given that many of these arrestees are unable to pay the bribe, they sit
in jail.
Second, corruption manifests itself in how the undertrial-prisoner is
treated while incarcerated.144 As two separate officials remarked, regard-
less of whether the inmate is a petty offender or a more serious one,
there is a simple rule of thumb. Those who can provide prison officials
with benefits, such as bribes paid for by supporters on the outside, have
142. Interview with high-level government official who served for years as a local police
officer before working his way up to the highest levels of law enforcement within India (May 19,
2010) (anonymity requested). Note, with respect to street-sweeps in the United States, the
Supreme Court, in the early 1970s, substantively began scaling-back police powers to engage in
this type of conduct. See, e.g., Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (voiding a city
anti-loitering law for vagueness). However, procedurally, the Court has increased the police’s
powers to search and take into custody individuals, particularly where there is probable cause. See,
e.g., Atwater v. Lagos Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). Once again, we thank Professor Wayne Logan for
illustrating to us this important bifurcated approach that the Court has followed.
143. Id. Also, this term, karcha-pani, literally translated means “water money,” and is used
mainly in the north and in Mumbai we were told.
144. Interview with high-level government official who served for years as a local police
officer before working his way up to the highest levels of law enforcement within India (May 19,
2010) (anonymity requested). Also, we note that there is a difference in India between what is
called “police custody” and “judicial custody.” As the CHRI explains, “[a]ny detention in police
custody for longer than 24 hours must be authorised by a magistrate. The detainee must be
released on bail unless the investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours and the officer has
grounds that an ‘accusation is well founded.’ In that case the officer can extend police custody
detention (without charge) for up to fifteen days (Section 167, Code of Criminal Procedure). A
magistrate has the power to authorise the detention of the accused beyond fifteen days if
“adequate grounds” exist for doing so. The maximum extension is for a period of up to 60 days in
judicial custody (or 90 days when the potential prison sentence ranges from 10 years to the death
penalty), after which the person must be released on bail (Section 167(2)(a) Code of Criminal
Procedure). Under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, police must file a charge
sheet with the particulars of the charge without delay—if the charge sheet is not filed before
the end of the extended detention period, the detained must be released on bail.” See COMMON-
WEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, INDIA: COUNTRY REPORT: ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS AND POLICING,
(Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/chogm/chogm_2007/docs/
country_reports/071004_chogm07_india_anti_terrorism_policing_country_report2007.pdf.
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an easier time in jail.145
Third, corruption is related to the extent to which the police
scrutinize the merits of an undertrial-prisoner’s case. During the de-
tention period, the police investigation often is thought to be depen-
dent upon how much money is transferred by the defendant, or his
supporters, to the inquiring law enforcement officials.146
Of course, these are not the only ways in which corruption emerges.
As we were told by one of the country’s highest-ranking law enforce-
ment officials—with nearly thirty years of experience—at almost every
stage of the process elements of corruption can be found.147 Perhaps
most disconcerting, he noted, is how and why certain undertrial cases
are allowed to proceed to trial while others are left to languish for
years, if not decades.148 Despite the aforementioned difficulties of
studying and eradicating corruption from this system, our view is that
this issue has to be addressed if the situation for undertrial-prisoners is
ever to improve.
There are ways to remove the undue power of the police and
prison-personnel so that the possibility of corrupt practices is lowered.
One measure would be to reduce the number of “unnecessary or
unjustified”149 arrests that officers make on a routine basis. Past studies,
including government studies, have noted that as high as “60% of all
145. Interview with high-level government official who served for years as a local police
officer before working his way up to the highest levels of law enforcement within India (May 19,
2010) (anonymity requested). This individual, in fact, related a very disturbing, but, he noted,
common, occurrence in Indian jails. Namely, there was a case he had recently learned about
where an infamous businessman had been detained for two weeks in a country in the Middle East.
Every night, according to the detainee, he had been raped by other inmates. Upon his release to
Indian officials who immediately placed this person in custody and flew with him back to India, he
cried on much of the return journey thanking his Indian police escorts and stating that he knew
that because of his resources (and his ability to buy off prison guards) that he would never have
been treated in such a manner and was confident that his subsequent incarceration within an
India jail would be much more humane. For a separate discussion of rapes in Indian prisons, see
SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 1–2; Interview with lawyer and leading civil society activist who works
on prison issues (May 17, 2010) (anonymity requested) (confirming this same point).
146. Interview with high-level government official who served for years as a local police
officer before working his way up to the highest levels of law enforcement within India (May 19,
2010) (anonymity requested); Interview with lawyer and leading civil society activist who works on
prison issues (May 17, 2010) (anonymity requested) (confirming this same point).
147. Interview with high-level government official who served for years as a local police
officer before working his way up to the highest levels of law enforcement within India (May 19,
2010) (anonymity requested).
148. Id.
149. See Batra, supra note 86.
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arrests”150 need never have occurred.151 To assist in this reduction,
there could be a review of offenses that are currently deemed criminal
that should, according to experts, be per se “bailable”152 or altogether
de-criminalized.153 In addition, there could be an expansion of of-
fenses that Indian penal law classifies as “compoundable.”154 Compound-
able crimes trace their roots back to old English common law and are
defined as those in which an aggrieved party may—without prosecuto-
rial input—relieve a guilty party of punishment upon the latter’s
payment to the former of a liability fee.155 Various jurisdictions around
the world have long abandoned this practice. Indian penal law, how-
ever, continues to recognize compoundable offenses. Given this reality,
and the reality of the country’s undertrial situation, a possible proposal
is to reclassify the number of petty offenses that are currently non-
compoundable into those that are compoundable. Such a move would
have to be closely monitored to determine whether it would make any
real difference in reducing the number of undertrial-prisoners;156 but
to alleviate the dire straits of the status quo, all options should be on the
table. These options include creatively considering how best to reduce
the number of people being held and awaiting trials for offenses that
the private law might more efficiently resolve.157
There are two other steps that should be considered by policy-
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. This is a term used within Indian criminal law and is found, for example, repeatedly in
the Law Commission of India, Seventy-Eighth Report. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92.
One crime, in particular, that is thought to clog the courts (and concomitantly the jails, because of
the people who are charged) is that which involves the bouncing of checks. One of the authors
(Krishnan) interviewed a highly respected government lawyer (May 20, 2010), who definitively
proclaimed that these matters constituted a significant proportion of the backlog and thought
that it should be a “no-brainer” in terms of not keeping check-bouncers behind bars. And indeed
the Supreme Court has agreed, noting in 2007, check bouncing cases are indeed compoundable
(see subsequent discussion in this paragraph) under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Vinay
Devanna Nayak v. Ryot Seva Sahakari Bank Ltd., A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 716.
153. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 17–19; SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 7.
154. See Vinay Devanna Nayak, supra note 152; LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 92,
at 17–19; SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 7.
155. For a discussion of the meaning compoundable crimes and how they are treated in
India, see the Supreme Court’s discussion in Vinay Devanna Nayak, supra note 152.
156. After all, one question that arises is what happens if an undertrial prisoner cannot afford
to pay the aggrieved party. Given that it is thought that many of the undertrials are indeed
socio-economically disadvantaged, perhaps expanding the number of compoundable offenses
would only have only a marginal impact.
157. See also SREEKUMAR, supra note 110, at 7.
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makers, each which relates to the functioning of the Indian legal
profession. On both sides of Indian law—civil and criminal—the
respective procedural codes allow for tactics of delay to be employed by
lawyers. Empirical work shows that there is a cadre of delay-lawyers who
proudly specialize in prolonging cases within the court system.158 In the
Indian criminal law context, prosecutors regularly are thought to
manipulate the procedure code’s different interlocutory appeals provi-
sions to keep cases at bay for long periods of time. Where prosecutors
are unable to produce necessary evidence or witnesses, or where they
discover other holes in their case, it is not uncommon for them to file
adjournment motions so that they can pursue an interlocutory appeal,
often on a minor issue, to buy more time.159
We believe that this practice cannot continue. Reforming the ap-
peals process on the civil justice side has proven to be difficult and has
drawn strong opposition from the bar mainly because many lawyers’
fees are determined by the frequency in which they appear in court.
Cutting appeals thus means reducing their revenue. For prosecutors,
who are not paid in such a manner but instead are salaried, this same
type of issue should not arise. Although, because promotions in prosecu-
tors’ offices can be based on convictions, and since promotions result
in higher salaries, if delays can serve to benefit a prosecutor’s case, then
conceivably remuneration would be tied to this tactic. If this is true, the
objective must be to change the incentive-structure—and more broadly
the culture—within prosecutors’ offices so that such delays can be
eliminated.
The other shift that needs to occur involves increasing pro bono
legal services, particularly by lawyers working in India’s fast-growing,
wealthy, private law firm sector. The financial boom within this seg-
ment of the Indian legal profession is well known.160 Elite lawyers
working in top firms in places like Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore, and
158. See Galanter & Krishnan, Bread for the Poor, supra note 57; MOOG, supra note 19; Krishnan,
Lawyering for a Cause, supra note 57 at 590–91 (2006); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Transgressive Cause
Lawyering in the Developing World, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN
LEGAL PRACTICE (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005) [hereinafter Krishnan, Transgressive
Cause Lawyering].
159. Indeed even on the defense side, lawyers are thought to engage in delay, especially
where strong prosecution witnesses are ready to testify against the accused. The conventional
wisdom here is that, particularly for powerful defendants, lawyers will move for continuances
(adjournments) to give their clients and their clients’ (often nefarious) contacts time to intimi-
date these prosecution witnesses.
160. See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 57 (2010).
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Hyderabad are among the richest legal professionals in the world.161
Many of the best law school graduates intensely vie for positions in
these offices, and with foreign law firms currently barred from practic-
ing in India, lucrative foreign clients routinely turn to Indian lawyers to
perform legal services.162 As such, the profits these Indian firms turn
range, as one observer has noted, “from high to astronomical.”163
Unfortunately, however, the success of these law firms, particularly
post-liberalization in the early 1990s, has not translated into a commit-
ment of pro bono legal services for the underprivileged. Yes, of course,
there are exceptions, and occasionally there are charitable contribu-
tions made by law firm lawyers towards important social justice causes.
By and large, though, there simply is no real, substantive culture of
pro bono legal services—particularly on behalf of those such as under-
trial-prisoners—existing within the Indian law firm sector.164 Why
there is such an absence and how there can be a transformation of the
status quo are questions that deserve full inquiries unto themselves
which we leave for another day.165 If real improvements are to occur for
the undertrial population, there have to be both structural and attitudi-
nal changes from the various stakeholders that make up the Indian
legal profession, including from those who are prospering today within
the country’s most lucrative law firms.
V. CONCLUSION
We began this article with a discussion of how the main remedy for
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Interview with prominent Indian lawyer who actually supports market liberalization
(June 4, 2008) (anonymity requested).
164. Note there have been pro bono legal services provided by Indian courtroom advocates
and non-governmental organizations. For a discussion of this point, see Krishnan, Lawyering for a
Cause, supra note 57, Krishnan, Transgressive Cause Lawyering, supra note 158.
165. The lead author of this study is currently engaged in researching this subject, but one
additional point needs to be made. Some will wonder whether law firm lawyers in India are
capable of engaging in the difficulties that accompany everyday courtroom criminal litigation.
There is an assumption that because these law firm lawyers are working on transactional matters,
they may not be equipped to handle anything else. This perception, however, is countered by the
fact that in many of these law firms, the lawyers do practice in litigation. Indeed, several of the
well-known firms have dedicated litigation departments. Moreover, in addition to the sheer
number of extra lawyers that the law firms can provide, they also have the ability to offer
much-needed resources to assist undertrial-prisoners with their cases; and thus we believe that
there would be a benefit to having these law firm practitioners involved in such a pro bono
manner.
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those who fail to receive a speedy trial in the United States is “dismissal
with prejudice.” As we explained, there are scholars, like Akhil Amar,
who argue that such an outcome should be rethought in the American
context. Monetary damages are one alternative put forth, as is condi-
tional release on bail. In India, the latter has also been advanced,
whereas the former has not made its way into the discussion, likely
because of the financial toll it would have on this still developing
nation-state. Perhaps more importantly, however, the fact remains that
for those Indian undertrial-prisoners who have been released because
they did not receive a speedy trial, we do not know whether they were
granted dismissals with prejudice, or if many of them continue to await
prosecution. Even for the recent 2010 undertrials released by Law
Minister Moily’s plan the empirical reality is that we simply have too
little data on the status of these individuals.
Ascertaining this vital information is only one of the several over-
whelming challenges facing the Indian criminal justice system, and
thus sustained, long-term change is unlikely in the near future. Con-
sider, for example, the government’s recently passed set of amend-
ments to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Among the new provisions
in the law include tightening the circumstances under which the police
can make arrests,166 increasing the number of bailable and compound-
able offenses,167 and using video technology during the detention
process168—all proposals we presented above. The reaction, however,
from defenders of the status quo has been swift. Some have said that
the police now will be hamstrung in their investigative powers.169
Others have noted that the amendments dilute the deterrence effect
on potential criminals.170 Some lawyers and public officials have even
166. See The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008, No. 5, Acts of Parlia-
ment, 2009, available at http://www.taxindiaonline.com/RC2/pdfdocs/Crpc.pdf.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Jug Suraiya, Free-for-All-Crime, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 21, 2009, http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/articleshow/4009417.cms. This article and a detailed summary of the debate can
be found in, Tarunabh Khaitan, Defending the New Arrest Law: Responding to Critiques by Lawyers and
Feminists, LAW & OTHER THINGS, (Jan. 29, 2009, 12:08 PM), http://lawandotherthings.blogspot.
com/2009/01/defending-new-arrest-law-responding-to.html. Note also that technology-use has
been call for by the Chief Justice of India in the serving of notices to defendants. He has argued
that email notices should be used by the courts as a means of facilitating this process. See To Reduce
Delays SC Will Send Notice on Email, TIMES OF INDIA, July 27, 2010, http://timesofindia.india
times.com/india/To-reduce-delays-SC-will-send-notice-on-email/articleshow/6221007.cms.
170. See Suraiya, supra note 169; Khaitan, supra note 169.
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gone on strike to express their dismay in the changes.171
Criminal law scholar, Tarunabh Khaitan, has provided an insightful
analysis of these amendments and the responses. As he notes, the
motives, particularly by the opposing lawyers, have been questionable
from the start.172 As already mentioned, many Indian litigators are paid
per court appearance. With the possible reduction in the number of
arrests as a result of the amendments, there is an unstated assumption
among these lawyers that their fees will correspondingly decline.
However, as Khaitan explains, there will still be work for these lawyers
in court. Under the proposed changes it will be on behalf of those
sitting in jails who, under the new amendments, should not be.173
Regardless, Khaitan, like us, is less-than-sanguine about the impact the
amendments will have on the penal process, observing that they likely
“appear set to join the ranks”174 of:
“Acts duly passed by Parliament but not brought into force by
the government . . . . Rather sad for undertrial prisoners, who
would have been the main beneficiaries of these amend-
ments.”175
Thus, this is the situation in which undertrial-prisoners find them-
selves. Indeed, in this article, we have supported various past proposals
and made recommendations of our own. These include, for example,
greater use of technology to expedite the proceedings for undertrial
prisoners and the establishment of independent committees to moni-
tor how quickly undertrial cases are adjudicated. In addition, we sup-
port courtroom mobility, whereby judges would travel to the jails
currently holding undertrial detainees in order to accelerate the
pre-trial process. More systemically, recognizing, confronting, and
finding thoughtful measures to eradicate the many ways corruption
permeates the criminal system is of critical importance if real changes
are to be seen. And then there is the responsibility of the legal pro-
fession itself to play a more substantive role in ensuring that self-serving
171. See Suraiya, supra note 169; Khaitan, supra note 169.
172. See Khaitan, supra note 169; see also Tarunabh Khaitan, Arresting Facts, INDIAN EXPRESS,
Jan. 17, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/arresting-facts/411767/0.
173. See Khaitan, supra note 169; see also Tarunabh Khaitan, Judicial Notice of Unenforced
Legislation, LAW & OTHER THINGS, (Feb. 13, 2009, 5:05 AM), http://lawandotherthings.blogspot.
com/2009/02/judicial-notice-of-unenforced.html [hereinafter Khaitan, Judicial Notice].
174. See Khaitan, Judicial Notice, supra note 173.
175. Id.
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delays are eliminated and that a greater culture of pro bono legal services
gains wider acceptance within the bar.
The stark reality is that in addition to top-down legislation that
attempts to mandate reforms, there must be a major cultural and
attitudinal transformation of views in Indian society towards these
incarcerated individuals. Further, there needs to be systematic consid-
eration of the tremendous costs imposed on society by continuing to
permit such an inefficient penal process.176 Finally, as scholars and
policy-makers continue to research ways to improve the undertrial
dilemma, there must be greater scrutiny of the personnel working
within the criminal justice system. Who are these prosecutors? Who are
the defense lawyers? How adequate are the legal services they are
providing? And, what type of training and professionalism do these
legal actors receive?
As a final note on the state of Indian legal community, there is a real
sense among attuned observers that a large percentage of the country’s
900-plus law schools has failed to produce adequate lawyers.177 If this is
the case, and lower level criminal courts are being staffed with under-
qualified people, then attacking the undertrial problem may require
working in conjunction with those seeking to improve the quality of
legal education in India. Again, this is an issue requiring empirical
study. It is a reminder that institutions are only as good as the people
within them; and that when it comes to a country’s criminal justice
176. There are a host of costs that include: costs to run these filled-undertrial prisons; time,
money, and energy of the various legal and judicial staff to attend to undertrial cases; time, money,
and energy that these individuals could devote to other pressing matters were it not for this
undertrial-burden, and the like.
177. See Kian Ganz, The Power of One, 57 LEGALLY INDIA, July 16, 2010, http://www.legally
india.com/201007161108/Newsletters/the-power-of-one-issue-57 (noting the Solicitor General,
Gopal Subramaniam’s, plan “of introducing ethics rules for lawyers and effectively closing down
more than 80 per cent of India’s 913 law schools”). Also, according to a highly respected lawyer
with whom we corresponded and who appears regularly in a lower district court in Delhi, these
problems associated with Indian legal education have also resulted in a dearth of quality judges in
the district courts. As he notes, “with the present system in India, a law graduate can sit for judicial
examinations, immediately after passing out of the law school. The number of persons falling in
this category is increasing by the day. These individuals, who are fresh from law schools, and have
very little or no practical knowledge of the working of laws and the legal system . . . often are
clueless about various aspects of their job, and are therefore unable to decide cases expeditiously.
Grant of frequent adjournments is one aspect of this, which ultimately contributes to backlog of
cases, and ultimately to denial of the right to speedy trial. I am not saying that all the newly
appointed judges are like this, but this is a serious problem, which is voiced by a vast number of
lawyers in India.” Correspondence with Lawyer (anonymity provided upon request) (August 28,
2010) (on file with author).
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system in particular—where liberty, freedom, and fairness are all at
stake—this point must never be forgotten.
APPENDIX 1
ADDITIONAL UNDERTRIAL CASES FROM 2000 ON,
FROM FOOTNOTE 75, ABOVE.
1. T.K. Gopal & Gopi v. State of Karnataka, 2000 A.I.R. 1669
2. Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B. and Another, 2000 A.I.R.
3. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Surinder Mohan and Others, 2000
A.I.R. 1862
4. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy, 2000
A.I.R. 2083
5. Seeta Hemchandra Shahittal and Another v. State of Maha-
rashtra, 2001 A.I.R. 1248
6. T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, 2001 A.I.R. 2637
7. State of Rajasthan v. Maharaj Singh and Another, 2004 A.I.R.
4205
8. Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 A.I.R. 862
9. Jasbir Singh v. State of Punjab, 2006 (7) Suppl. S.C.R. 174
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
784 [Vol. 42
